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David X. Li is professor of Finance at the Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF). For
more than two decades, he worked at leading nancial institutions in the areas of product de-
velopment, risk management, asset/liability management, and investment analytics. He was the
chief risk ocer for China International Capital Corporation (CICC) Ltd, head of credit derivative
research and analytics at Citigroup and Barclays Capital, and head of modeling for AIG Invest-
ments.
David has a PhD degree in Statistics from the University of Waterloo, Masters degrees in Eco-
nomics, Finance, and Actuarial Science, and a Bachelor’s degree in Mathematics. David is cur-
rently an Associate Editor for the North American Actuarial Journal, an adjunct professor at the
University of Waterloo, a senior research fellow at Global Risk Institute in Toronto, and a senior
advisor to the Risk Management Institute at the National University of Singapore. David was one
of the pioneers in credit derivatives. His seminal work of using copula functions for credit port-
folio modeling has been widely cited by academic research, broadly used by practitioners for
credit portfolio trading, risk management and rating, and well covered by the media (Wall Street
Journal, Financial Times, Nikkei, and CBC News).
The seventh interviewof our series is an in-depth discussion about the origin, use, and criticismof copula
models in portfolio default risk modeling. Mathematical nance was among the rst elds to adopt copula
techniques, but it was the fast growth of the market for credit derivatives that boosted research activity on
copulas, particularly on high-dimensional families and factor models. A seminal paper – introducing copula
techniques to model a vector of default times – was published by David X. Li, see [11]. With the article “The
formula that killed Wall Street” by Felix Salmon inWIRED Magazine, February 23, 2009, republished in [18],
David and his model received world-wide media coverage.
In the following, our questions to David X. Li are typeset in bold-face.
1 Educational background
Would you please tell us something about your educational background?
I grew up during the Cultural Revolution Period (1966–1976) in a rural area of China and had a sporadic
early education. Certain subjects, such as Mathematics and Physics, might be taught well by teachers who
happened to be “intellectuals” expelled froma city environment to the countryside. Other subjects were often
taught by high school, or 2-year college, graduates who barely learned anything serious in their own studies.
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I majored in Mathematics at college, where I learned the basics of pure mathematics. I enjoyed math-
ematics in high school, but pure mathematics at university level wasn’t very appealing to me. I found more
applied subjects, suchasprobability and statistics,more interesting.After graduating fromcollege, I switched
to studyingEconomics atNankaiUniversity. At that time, China started focusing on its economic development
and opening up to the world. As a result, the country was eager to train a group of professional managers and
economists. I left the country to study for anMBAdegree in Finance at Université Laval in Quebec City in 1987,
originally intending to return to China.
At Université Laval I learned all the basics of modern nance and became keenly interested in the sub-
ject. Many of the professors were trained at top schools in the US or Europe. Very quickly I found that my
mathematical skills were not good enough to read the latest research papers. I decided to study more Math-
ematics and Statistics at the University of Waterloo. I also picked up Actuarial Science and got my associate
designation from the Society of Actuaries (ASA) by passing ten written exams. I ended up with ve degrees
in ve dierent subjects. To a certain extent, I had always been playing a catch up when switching from one
subject to another.
Who was particularly inuential for your education?
At the University ofWaterloo I took classes at all levels in dierent areas: Finance, Actuarial Science, and
Statistics. Waterloo has one of the best Actuarial Science programs in the world. I took classes in Actuarial
Science with Professors Harry Panjer, Gordon Wilmot, Steve Brown, Allen Brender, and Keith Sharp. I took
Professor Phelim Boyle’s Finance class at the PhD level. I learned most of my statistics skills from a group
of great statisticians: Professors Je Wu, David Sprott, Don McLeish, Mary Thompson, Bovas Abraham, and
Chris Small.
In my PhD thesis I extended estimating function theory to Bayesian statistics and then applied it to cred-
ibility theory in actuarial science. I got a chance to work very closely with Professor Vidyadhar Godambe ¹
who introduced the concept of estimating functions. At that time, he had already retired, but still came to
the oce every day. For the entire summer of 1994, I sat in his oce a few times a week to learn and discuss
with him. What a great mind! We had many visitors in Waterloo: Hans Bühlmann and Paul Embrechts, see
[3], visited frequently, along with David Cox, Arnold Zellner, and other top statisticians.
I left Waterloo for a tenure-track position at the University of Manitoba, one year before I completed my
PhD studies, and went to work in the nancial industry immediately after my graduation. Consequently, I
never had a chance to spend more time on academic research. This explains, why I now decided to go back
to school to teach and to do research after 23 years of working in the industry.
My supervisors, Professor PhelimBoyle (seeFig. 1) andProfessorHarryPanjer (seeFig. 2), hadaparticular
impact on me. Harry was always encouraging to students and open-minded. When we discussed about the
topic of my PhD thesis, Harry was very exible and let me decide. It was also a lot of fun to work with him. He
sometimes took us for a ight on his airplane and we ew over his farm. Phelim was very inspirational and
always very nice to graduate students. He encouraged me to study more nance and I was totally impressed
by his dedication to and passion for research. He placed a lot of emphasis on using intuition and eective
explanation in addition to employing rigorous quantitative techniques.
2 Financial engineering in the credit market
What was your rst employment in the nancial industry?
Upon graduation in 1995, I joined the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) as a senior analyst in its risk man-
agement department. I was working on market risk for equity and foreign exchange (FX) businesses. I also
worked on credit exposure calculation. At that time we didn’t use the name value-at-risk, but “dollar-at-risk.”
1 An obituary was published in the IMS Bulletin by Mary Thompson, see http://bulletin.imstat.org/2016/09/obituary-v-p-
godambe-1926-2016/
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Figure 1: Phelim Boyle, David Li, and Mary Hardy in 2016.
Immediately I realized that a lot of practical work required quantication. But sometimes quantitative con-
ceptswere used very loosely. For example, credit exposurewas calculated as themaximumof potential future
losses at dierent points in time in the future. At each time point, it was calculated as the 95th percentile po-
tential loss. Then, the nal credit exposure was still called the 95th percentile credit exposure. You really
didn’t know to which probability space (or distribution) this 95th percentile was related to.
That was the beginning of a period in which the derivative ² business in the nancial industry grew
rapidly. It was wonderful to learn about all these new products and their pricing models. With the training
fromve academic degrees, I felt that I was one of themost prepared persons in the industry, but I still needed
to learn the market conventions and I had to develop implementation skills in programming languages such
as C/C++ and VBA. A strongmathematical and statistical education denitely providedme the foundation to
work on a number of applied problems. Finance and Actuarial Science training were very useful, too, since
they helped to formulate a practical problem into a mathematical model. Dierent PhD graduates had dier-
ent “nails” at hand when they came to work in the industry. Sometimes, it is a narrow view trying to solve a
problem using only the “nails” at hand, since there might be better tools available for a specic problem. It
was an exciting period, as there were a lot of product innovations, new ideas, and the interaction between
industry and academia was very uent.
I used the opportunity to learn as much as I could from professors and more experienced practitioners
in the industry. For example, John Hull and Alan White were very active and gave seminars at the University
of Toronto. At RBC we had Professor Durrell Due as a consultant for credit risk, that was the rst time I got
to know him. Subsequently, I consulted him from time to time on credit risk and credit derivative pricing.
How was the mood among quantitative analysts in the pre-crisis days? What role did stochastic
models play?
Before the nancial crisis, most derivative pricing models had become “time-tested” and were available
in mature forms – with the exception of models for credit derivatives. The credit derivative market was still at
2 Editorial remark: A derivative is a contractwhose value depends on the price of an underlying asset. Depending on the complex-
ity of the stochastic model for the underlying and the contract details, nding the price of a derivative is a dicult mathematical
task.
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the forefront of innovation, with products such as pay-as-you-go (PAUG) CDS contracts for ABS bonds, CDX
indices, CDX tranches, CDS options, ABX indices, ABX tranches, and option products for CDOs ³, etc. This
attracted a group of quants who traditionally worked with interest rates. They took a close look at the status
quo of credit-portfolio modeling and felt that credit-portfolio models lacked “dynamics,” expressed in terms
of stochastic processes as typically used for interest-rate modeling. There was a lot of eort to come up with
new models to replace the Gaussian-copula framework. With the exception of certain option products for
portfolio, most of these new models were not broadly accepted in the industry.
A few years before the nancial crisis I had switched my attention to mortgages, mainly subprime, and
the modeling of new products such as PAUG CDS on ABS bonds, ABS CDOs, and ABX tranches. I didn’t know
much about mortgages and had to start from scratch by building a team. I rst interviewed some experi-
encedmortgage modelers. But mortgage modeling at that time focused on agencymortgages, in which credit
risk modeling was not required, as Fed agencies provided a guarantee for the default risk and the focus was
mainly on interest-rate modeling. I also found that most mortgage modelers didn’t have a strong statistical
background, especially no training in survival analysis. I formed a small teamwith quants already in the rm
having a strong statistical backgroundandaddeda fewyoungPhDgraduates, capable students fromStanford
and Columbia, to investigate the problem from scratch. We started from tabulation usingmultiple decrement
theory and moved to dynamic competing risk models. The modeling involved three stages: rst, we needed
to do fundamental modeling for mortgages for both prepayment and default risks. Then we needed to model
the waterfall structures in the ABS bonds, since these bonds are in tranches, already securitized. Finally, we
needed to model the derivative features either with PAUG CDS on ABS bonds or with ABS CDOs which are
more like a CDO squared.
It didn’t take us long to understand that newly issued subprime mortgages had default rates of 3 to 5
times, or even 6 to 7 times, higher than the mortgages issued in the early days. If this trend continued, the
ABX index bonds should be priced at 30 or 40 cents on a dollar, but they were still traded around par in the
market at that time! Considering the potential loss that an ABS team could experience, our mood was pretty
bad. But this knowledge was conned to a small group and the overall market was still ebullient. CDX, the
North American credit index of 125 investment grade names, was pushed all the way down to 27 basis points
before the Summer of 2006. Then, a one day 30% price drop in March 2007 was a wake up call to everyone
and for the next couple of years there was a lot of confusion around the value of these complicated securities.
Having the best modelers did not imply the ability to get the message to the top and help the rm to avoid
the crisis. Laurie Goodman was a long time, top-ranked-by-the-industry mortgage modeler at UBS, but UBS
incurred one of the largest losses in subprime among all Wall Street rms during the nancial crisis. It was
quite a conundrum tomix themodeling of complicated securitieswith incentives to hide large losses,whether
this is for large bonuses, fear of losing shareholder value, or simply the prospect of keeping one’s own job.
3 The Gaussian copula model
Let’s start from the beginning. What was the application you had in mind when you developed what
is nowadays known as the Gaussian copula model for credit portfolio defaults?
3 Editorial remark: A very basic credit derivative is the CDS contract. Essentially, it constitutes an insurance like contract, where
premium payments are exchanged for a default compensation that is due if a reference bond defaults. The main task in pricing
such contracts is to model the default time of the underlying bond (neglecting recovery-rate risk and interest-rate risk). If many
such contracts are pooled, one speaks of a CDS index. CDX is the name for a family of tradable credit default swap indices in
North America. The pricing problem becomesmuchmore complicated if a pool of credits is “sliced into tranches,” as done in case
of a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). The non-linear way of distributing the loss withing the credit portfolio to the dierent
tranches of the pool requires a model for the dependence structure among the individual credits in order to price the tranches.
For this modeling step, David X. Li pioneered the use of copulas. The acronym ABS stands for asset-backed security – a security
collateralized by a pool of assets such as credit cards. The non-agency residential mortgage backed securities are also called ABS
bonds.
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The intention was to solve practical problems for our sales and trading business in the nancial prod-
ucts group at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Canada (CIBC) in the middle of the 90s. For example, we were
worrying about the joint default of a reference credit and a counterparty in a single name CDS contract. More
specically, we might have a CDS with the Korean Development Bank as the reference asset and a Japanese
bank as the counterparty, which occurred before the Asian crisis. In the emerging market credit derivative
business in the period from 1996 to 1999 we already had small basket credit derivatives such as a rst-to-
default (FTD) and a second-to-default (STD) contract ⁴. Cash CDO or more CBOs were already issued, and
various credit linked notes were created.
How did you rst discover copulas as a methodological tool? Is this somehow linked to your aca-
demic background in Actuarial Science?
I heard about copulas from my colleague Jacques Carrière, when both of us were teaching Actuarial Sci-
ence at the University of Manitoba. He was doing a research project with Professor Jed (Edward) Frees and
his then PhD student Emiliano Valdez at the University of Wisconsin, see [6]. Emiliano is now a professor of
Actuarial Science at the University of Connecticut. The project was about the valuation of joint life annuity
products by considering the broken heart syndrome. Traditionally for valuation actuaries take a couple’s life
contingencies as independent of each other: male policyholders follow male mortality tables, while female
ones follow female mortality tables. But as a couple they live in the same house and travel together and they
are exposed to a lot of common risks. When they get older, they depend on each other even more. The death
of one spouse has a big impact on the other. Empirical studies show that the impact is even not symmetrical:
the impact from a death of the wife has much larger impact on the life of the husband than vice versa. They
did some empirical studies using data from Great West Life, found a positive correlation of survival times for
couples, and studied the impact on the valuation of joint life annuity products using copulas. I was aware of
this research from Jacques, but I didn’t spend much time to learn more details then, as I was still trying to
complete my PhD thesis on a totally dierent topic.
I initially spent a lot of time using the stochastic hazard rate model introduced by Due and Singleton
[2] and applied it to CDO pricing, but I couldn’t get the model to t the market. In addition, traders didn’t
like models with a large number of parameters and the computational demand was tremendous, even with
a Window NT 3.0 environment. I started to look for a “simple” solution. That was when I asked Emiliano to
send me his working paper with Jed and Jacques, see [6]. He sent me the working paper [7] (by fax!) while I
was working for CIBC Financial Products Group in New York. At that time, Roger Nelsen, see [4], was about
to publish his book [16] on copulas. I reached out to him for a preprint and promised to buy a copy when the
book got published. I hope the reference to his book in my paper helped him to sell more copies. Professor
Paul Embrechts (see Fig. 3) gave a talk at Columbia University in 1999 on copulas with applications in risk
management, see [5]. I approached him and told Paul that I had been using copulas for the last few years. He
was surprised and asked me what I used copulas for. I mainly used them for the pricing of credit derivatives.
ShaunWang [19] wrote a research report for the Casualty Society of Actuaries (CAS), an application to capital
allocation, which I also read. I spent quite some time in the New York Public Library to read some conference
proceedings on copulas, especially articles on the construction of copulas using extreme value distributions.
Youmentioned that youwrote your PhDon a “totally dierent topic.”Would youmind explaining
it in a few sentences?
I had taken a lot of classes in statistics at the University of Waterloo, but never did any research in statis-
tics. Also, I was expecting to work in the industry after my PhD studies, and writing a PhD thesis could be the
last chance for me to do a research project using statistics. So, for my PhD topic I chose to work on estimating
functions with applications to credibility theory.
4 Editorial remark: A rst-to-default (second-to-default) derivative is similar to a CDS contract. Again, an insurance premium is
exchanged against potential default compensation. The dierence is the denition of the default event, which is now the rst
(second) default event within a pool of credits. Consequently, the dependence structure within the default times of the entities in
the pool needs to be modeled.
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Figure 2: David Li and Harry Panjer at David Li’s PhD graduation ceremony in 1995.
The theory of estimating functions, see [8], is a generalized estimating method which unies estimating
methods such asmaximum likelihood estimation (MLE) or the least squares (LS)method. An estimating func-
tion is a function of both data or observations and parameters to be estimated. For example, a score function
used in MLE is an estimating function. In spirit, it is similar to the generalizedmethod of moments (GMM) for
which Lars Hansen, see [9], won aNobel prize in economics. I wasworking on the extension of the framework
by adding prior information (still in terms of estimating functions) and then applied it to credibility theory.
When I was working at the University of Manitoba, I worked with Professor Harry Turtle, see [12], to expand
one subsection in my PhD thesis and published a paper on GARCH parameter estimation using the theory of
estimating functions. I still wish that there were more interactions between researchers in these two areas.
YoumentionedPaulEmbrechts.Hispaper [5] hadaconsiderable impact ondependencemodeling
in Quantitative Risk Management. Was it also relevant to you?
Paul gave a talk at the Columbia-JAFEE Conference on the Mathematics of Finance on March 28, 1999
with the title Insurance Analytics: Actuarial Tools in Financial Risk Management. In this presentation Paul
talked about his research paper with Alex McNeil and Daniel Straumann Correlation and Dependence in Risk
Management: Properties and Pitfalls. This might have been the rst occasion that the concept of copulas was
presented to a large audience in the nancial industry. At that time, I was writing the paper [11] which was
lately published in the Journal of Fixed Income. But most of the work was already done during 1996–1998,
while I was working at CIBC in its Financial Products Group. The paper of Paul and his coauthors addresses
much broader issues around correlation, which had and still has a great impact on the whole industry. I,
personally, was simply focusing on credit-portfolio modeling at that time. Paul is a prolic researcher with
research topics across dierent areas. He is also very inspiring and helpful to others. He is one of the best
people to combine academic research with industry needs. I have always looked up to him for advice and
help.
In your famous paper [11] you mention various copula families. In your opinion, why did the -
nancial industry end up using precisely the Gaussian copula?
This can be traced back to the modeling of a rm’s asset returns. As in Merton’s seminal work, see [15],
the assets of a rm aremodeled as a lognormal process, and hence, the returns as a normal process. But if you
look at the problempurely froman engineering perspective: using a copula to create a joint distribution based
ongivenmarginals, you can, in theory, usemany other copula functions. Actually,we studied various copulas
on our trading desk such as the Frank copula andmixture copulas based on extreme value distributions. Once
you control the correlation byhaving the same rank correlation, one can study the impact of dierent copulas.
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Figure 3: Paul Embrechts, David Li, Patrick L. Brockett, and Harry Panjer at Harry Panjer’s retirement party in 2007.
I feel that the area had not come to the stage to dierentiate the subtle dierence that dierent copulas could
create at the early stage of using copulas in credit-portfolio modeling. Also, we need to have some economic
interpretation for the copula we chose and its parameters. I know quants from Lehman Brothers, see [13, 14],
were pushing for the Student’s t copula for a couple of years, but users found little dierence between the
Gaussian copula and the Student’s t copula when it came to the valuation of CDO tranches.
Inmy paper, I listed a few copula families. The example for a CDSwith a risky counterparty was based on
a mixture copula, while the example for FTD pricing was based on the Gaussian copula. I wasn’t specically
advocating the Gaussian copula, not to mention the “one factor Gaussian copula.” What I presented was a
general framework and the paper also established the link between the Gaussian copula and the one-period
Merton model.
Market participants need a simple model to communicate with each other. People use implied volatility
for option quotes with the understanding that we all use the Black–Scholes formula. We use the one-factor
(or one parameter) Gaussian copula for CDX or ITRAXX tranche trading for the same reason. I feel that the
Gaussian copula has become popular for both its economic interpretation and its simplicity, especially with
a single correlation parameter.
Was (or is) there awareness in the industry that various commercial portfolio-defaultmodels give
rise to the same dependence structure as provided by the Gaussian copula –mostlywithoutmention-
ing it?
There were denitely people who might have used the concept, but might not know the concept of copu-
las. Joe Pimbley, who was working with Moody’s in 1995, wrote a dozen-page note on how to build a dynamic
model for joint defaults. In this note he had described all essential elements of a dynamic model for credit-
portfolio modeling: a stochastic interest rate model for the yield curve, a dynamic model for spreads, and
embedded default into the process with “tests” for default at every time step. But it didn’t specify how to
model the default time, and to use asset returns for correlation.
Many of the credit-modeling papers were published during the period 1994–2000. Due and Singleton
published their paper [2] as a working paper in 1994, and the nal version in 1999. The Jarrow–Turnbull [10]
paper was published in 1995. The KMV technical document by Vasicek was available around 1995. The Cred-
itMetrics Technical Document by JP Morgan [1], CreditRisk+: Technical Documentation by CSFB [21], and
CreditPortfolio View by McKinsey [22] were all published in 1997 and 1998.
As a practitioner in the credit area, I was keenly aware of the latest research developments and I spent a
lot of time to digest the research, beneting fromdirect contact tomost of the authors. Professor Turnbulll was
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working for CIBC, rst as a consultant and then as a full-time employee, when I was working for CIBC, where
most of the ideas of applying the concept of copulas in credit were conceived, studied, and applied to solve
practical problems in credit derivative pricing and trading, as well as in credit-portfolio modeling. Professor
Turnbull was consulted frequently, and he might be one of the rst academic people to whom I presented
the idea of using copulas for credit portfolio modeling. I got to know Professor Due in 1995 and often met
with him to get his advice or to learn about the latest developments in the academic world. In 2000 at the
Society of Actuaries (SOA) 50-year anniversary meeting in San Francisco I, as an SOA Investment Section
council member, organized a session on credit portfolio modeling and invited Chris Finger, one of the three
authors for CreditMetrics, Tom Wilde, who was the main person behind CreditRisk+, and Tom Wilson, who
created CreditPortfolioView at McKinsey, as panelists in the session. I knew that KMV, CreditMetrics, what
Joe Pimbely implied in his note, were all based on the Gaussian copula, even though the copula concept was
not used explicitly in their approaches. Explicitly linking these models to the Gaussian copula framework
helped with the conceptual understanding of the model and possible extensions. In addition, it also helped
with the ecient implementation. For example, the one-factor model based on conditional independence
had substantially improved the computational speed of the Gaussian copula model.
When I joined the RiskMetrics Group (RMG) at the beginning of 1999, I told Chris Finger about the equiv-
alence of the CreditMetrics approach and the Gaussian copula model. It took us two afternoons in front of a
white board to go through the technical details. Actually, it was Chris Finger who strongly suggested me to
write a paper about it. I wrote the paper and had it as one of the research papers at RMG, and made it avail-
able to the public. Chris sent the working paper to Micky Bahtia who called and suggested to submit it for
publication as soon as possible.
I read and studied all the above approaches, but my major concern at that time was to solve practical
problems that we were facing in credit derivative sales and trading. While each of the above approaches tack-
led credit problems froma dierent angle, theywere not necessarily all ready to be used in practice for pricing
and valuation. For example, CreditMetrics, KMV, and CreditPortfolioView are largely one period models with
the intention to obtain the loss distribution over one period for credit-risk management or economic capital
calculation.
The rst conceptual challenge was to move away from this one period, or mainly one-year time horizon,
which seemed to be used by rating agencies and many others in the credit-portfolio modeling area. But for
the trading of credit derivatives we have to move away to cover the term structure of defaults. In practice, the
term structure is important, as a rm does not in general default if it does not have a debt to mature. Before
the Asian crisis one frequently traded name was the Korean Development Bank (KDB). When the Asian crisis
just started, KDB credit spreads showed a clear humped shape, rst increasing for the rst two to three years,
and then declining. It was the rst time that I observed such an evidently humped term structure of credit
spreads. The rationale in the market at that time was, that the Asian crisis just got started and no one knew
when it would be the worst, which explained why the spread moved upward for the rst two to three years.
But on the long term, the market speculated, South Korea sovereign should still have good credit if it could
overcome thediculty in thenext two to three years. Now it is all history andKDBcredit performedafterwards
almost exactly as traders had expected at the beginning of the crisis. So, I was trying to sort out the issue
of how to incorporate the term structure of spreads. It didn’t take too long for us to create a “credit curve”
which is expressed as the term structure of hazard rates. The underlying variable is the survival time for each
credit, and we describe it in a similar fashion as we do for the survival time of a human life as expressed in
a mortality table. Once we use the survival time to describe default it is easy for us to price single name CDS.
For some issues, such as the timing of default within a premium payment period, we simply used continuous
approximations instead ofwhat is called the JPMorgan approach or theHull–White approachwhich assumed
that default occurred at the end or in the middle of the premium payment period.
Of course, there were issues about recovery rates and recovery treatment assumptions. From a modeling
perspective, I preferred the Due–Singleton approach about recovery treatment, as it provided more con-
sistent results, especially when you dealt with forward starting transactions such as forward starting CDS.
I wrote a paper on “Constructing a credit curve” and published it in a special report of the Risk Magazine
in 1998, in which I introduced the “time-until-default” or survival time to model single name defaults and
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explained how to construct a credit curve based on market observables such as bond prices or asset-swap
spreads. This might be one of the rst papers on credit-curve construction. Once you constructed a credit
curve for each name in a credit portfolio, you wished to have a joint distribution of survival times to describe
the joint default properties for the credit portfolio. That was where copulas came into the picture.
Immediatelywe faced the issue “which copula to use?” and howwe should dealwith its parameters. That
waswhen the CreditMetrics - Technical Document, see [1], was released and I also read Vasicek’s handwritten
notes on credit portfoliomodeling back in 1995 or 1996. The link between the Gaussian copula and theMerton
model was established, and immediately we had a meaning for the correlation parameters in the Gaussian
copula: asset-return correlation. We used KMV or a simpler version, the CreditMetrics approach, for the asset
return correlation based on an equity risk-factormodel, and the empirical relationship between the asset size
and idiosyncratic risk of a rm. The rst application we had was on our single name CDS book, but with the
consideration of counterparty risk. Pricing the rst-to-default, the second-to-default, or CBOs became very
easy using a copula. So, the Gaussian copula was chosen mainly due to the fact that we model asset returns
as a normal distribution. In its original form, we could use dierent pair-wise correlation parameters in the
correlationmatrix instead of “one factor” or the one-parameter Gaussian copula model, which is a simplied
correlation structure for trading. We spent a lot of time studying how to reduce the dimensionality in the
correlation using various correlation structures or analytics such as principal axis analysis.
4 The credit crisis of 2007+
When did the nancial industry receive the rst warning signals on the Gaussian copulamodel? How
did it react?
In 2005 the Gaussian copula model had trouble calibrating to market prices, because of worries about
auto industry defaults. The spread for the equity tranche became very high, and the model had diculties to
calibrate a base correlation for certain mezzanine tranches. In this situation, you needed to think about the
cause of these issues.Was it a problem of themodel or was themarket pricing certain tranches not rationally?
For example, European side ITRAXX didn’t have the same issue with the worry of a few defaults in the auto
industry like in the US, but it also had diculties calibrating to the mezzanine tranches. I talked with one
trader on the London side and suggested him to sell protection on the equity tranche and buy protection on
mezzanine tranches. Within a few days he made more than USD 10 million; he suggested me that I should
start an internal hedge fund!
In a new market, we need to be careful about the validity of the market or the model. For a fundamental
market with simple instruments the traders as a group might have a collective rational opinion on the prices
of traded instruments. But in a brand new market, traders might have challenges to provide rational quotes
initially. For example, at the introduction of ITRAXX trading there were just a few large investments banks
providing two-way quotes for ITRAXX tranches. Every morning, these few banks sent out to their customers
a list of quotes with bid-ask spreads. One day a trader sent out his quote purposely to push the market in one
direction, but with a larger spread. To his surprise, many other rms just followed his quotes with a move in
the same direction.
We were using the one-factor Gaussian copula and base correlation for a while before we ran into the
situation (briey) in 2005 that we had a challenge calibrating it to the market. Many people were studying
and introducing alternativemodels. But up to this date, I donot know that there is one agreeduponalternative
model for credit portfoliomodeling for trading purposes. Themost common one is still based on the Gaussian
copula and base correlation, but with some modications such as random recovery rates.
Still, we need to take some fundamental reservations with respect to the Gaussian copula model. The
common criticisms are tail independence, static dependence structure, or poor hedging performance. I would
like to address each of the above points here.
Tail issues: As stated above, we use the Gaussian copula due to the fact that wemodel asset returns using
Brownian motions. Almost all nance theory is based on the normal distribution. Using base correlation is
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oneway to handle the problem of “not enough correlation / dependence” for senior tranches, which is linked
to the fact that the Gaussian copula is tail independent. Base correlation is similar to the implied volatility
concept, and volatility smiles or skews. To overcome tail independence, we could also see amixture Gaussian
copula model or a Gaussian copula model with random correlation, which is similar to a stochastic volatility
model for option pricing.
Static dependence structure: This is a somewhat vague comment. In a copula model based on survival-
time distributions we describe each credit only by default or not. This is a simplied way to describe the
evolution of credit quality, similar to dividing people into only “good” or “bad” ones. It has its dynamics, it
might have too strong dynamics. For example, if you look at the correlation from a conditional perspective
you would observe that the dependency might be too strong: conditional on one name default in one year,
another name with a positive correlation with this name would have conditional hazard rate move high up
very quickly, but it would take a long time for it to return to its original unconditional level under the Gaussian
copula framework.
Many modelers feel that we have to write a stochastic diusion equation to have a dynamic model. We
could use a stochastic process to describe the hazard rate for each credit and introduce correlation at the
level of the hazard-rate processes. That was the rst approach I was trying to implement. Unfortunately, it
didn’t capture the market well in addition to all computational burden. It took me a while to understand this
observation intuitively. You could think about a hazard rate as the “volatility” of a default event. It does not
matter how strong the correlation structure is, that you introduce at the “volatility” level, the correlation on
the default events is still pretty weak. Due and his PhD students have done some research in this area to
enhance the stochastic hazard-rate model, by having a common driving factor in all individual hazard-rate
processes, or by adding a jump process. This denitely helps to explain the real-world dynamics better. But
the model is not parsimonious, since we need to have a lot of parameters, and these models are dicult to
implement and to use in practice. How could we use this kind of models to manage hundreds of portfolio
type trades on a daily basis?
There were a lot of these “second generation” credit-portfolio models between 2005 and 2008 and many
of them originated from the interest-rate modeling area. In these models, the main focus is on the evolution
of the total credit portfolio loss distribution, each credit’s contribution is only on the initial term structure of
the expected portfolio loss distribution. The loss distribution over a specic time period is only captured by
the stochastic process from the total loss distribution. Few studies have been done on the shape and form of
the loss distribution underlying these models. The dynamics of the individual credit contribution is basically
fully lost with only a link to the expected portfolio loss distribution remaining.
How tohedge credit risk is still an area that requiresmore research.Dowehedge spread risk or default risk?
There are few empirical studies on hedging performance of credit spread risk based on the Gaussian copula
model, and the conclusion is not denitive. I might have missed something here, but I haven’t read some
comprehensive studies on this. Alex Reyfman wrote a research report while he was working for Bear Sterns.
We did a lot of internal studies at Citi and Barclays and couldn’t draw a denitive conclusion. The hedge
against default events is even more complicated. For example, we studied the default hedging for a small
basket problem such as a FTD. To have a perfect hedge of a 4-name FTD, we need to have trading instruments
of all single name CDS, FTD of every two names, and FTD and STD of every three names. Also, it would take
a very long time to test the hedging performance if you do not have a perfect hedge as indeed default by
denition is a rare event.
I had been aware of all these issues while I was working as a practitioner in sales and trading of nancial
institutions and had done a lot of research with the team I was heading and the colleagues I was working
with. We could point out more issues from a more technical perspective about the Gaussian copula model,
but to nd an alternative model to remediate these issues is muchmore challenging. I would like to see more
academic research in this area.
From the outside, one could have the impression that the nancial industry has built its riskman-
agement of amulti-billion dollar business in CDOs on a simple formula thatwas developed by a single
person in very little time. Is there some truth behind this observation or does it oversimplify? Why
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Figure 4: This graph shows the probability that the total portfolio loss is larger than a given amount, which we call excess loss
distribution. It also shows the impact of asset correlation on the shape of the excess loss distribution. The expected loss of a
CDO tranche is simply the area of the excess loss distribution line, bounded by the attachment and detachment points.
isn’t theremore research activity on such important topics as dependencemodeling or collaborations
with academia?
The Gaussian copula model is still the model used today for credit portfolio risk management and credit
portfolio trading. The derivative market develops with or without a model. For example, people started trad-
ing options long before the Black–Scholes formula came out. Of course, having a commonly accepted model
helps, and sometimes even accelerates the market development for a new product. My paper was published
in 2000, even though the model was implemented at CIBC around 1997. But the credit derivatives market and
credit portfolio trading started at the beginning of the 1990s.
The early development of the credit derivativemarket required goodmodeling to answer a lot of questions
and challenges that we encountered in practice. Rating agencies and other practitioners were using dierent
models for rating CBOs and CLOs. For example, the rating agency Moody’s used a model called “binomial
expansion” for portfolio transaction rating. All three major rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch started
adopting the Gaussian copula approach around 2004 or 2005.
Credit portfolio modeling is an interesting, but dicult problem. Defaults are rare events, most of the
early techniques used in insurance for rare events were based on an independence assumption. Second,
defaults, besides being idiosyncratically driven by an individual rm’s situation, are very much driven by
macroeconomic factors. The clustering of defaults observed is associated with the economic cycle. Third, for
amodel to be used for daily trading purpose it must be operationally simple. For example, we need to be able
to examine the change in the shape of loss distribution like in Fig. 4. Over the last two decades there have
been many alternative models suggested by both academics and industry, each might be used for a certain
specic case or a transaction, but none of them has reached the status to replace the Gaussian copula model.
Even though Iwrote therst paper onapplying copulas explicitly for credit portfoliomodeling, thiswasn’t
a single person eort. As I stated before, I had the opportunity to discuss and interact with leading academic
researchers and great practitioners, they have played a signicant role in forming the idea and crystallized
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its implementation. That was also a period in which many alternative ideas and approaches were published,
which helped the development of the idea. Many of them do not necessarily agree with the approach. For
example, I havemet ProfessorDarrell Duemany times, and every timewemet hewould tellme that “I donot
like copulas, but I haven’t found a better solution yet.” Professor Stuart Turnbull might be the rst academic
whom I formally presented the idea of using copulas for credit portfolio modeling; he wasn’t enthusiastic.
But my intention was to solve the practical problems, as I was in the credit derivative trading team, where
new products and trading ideas came up on a daily basis. I spent my day time to interact with traders and
structurers to understand the practical problems and spent my evening time to read academic and industry
research papers to seek for a good solution. I tried to absorb, as much as I could, all academic research and
the latest development in the industry in this area.
As a practitioner, I was pretty open to tell technical problems to others, especially academic people, with
the hope that we could nd better solutions, especially theoretically justied solutions, not just “industry
fudge” solutions. I gave talks at top universities such as Columbia, Stanford, Fudan, etc. One timemyCitibank
boss, ThierryBollier, and I sat at a tablewith a groupof top academics includingProfessor KenFrench. Thierry
posed exactly your question: “Why can’t academic people spend more time studying the practical problems
such as the credit portfolio modeling problem?” Ken rst argued against it, by saying that our problem was
not as important as the optimal capital structure problem or equity puzzle problem in Finance, but then
conceded that academic people did not know these problems and they did not have data.
To summarize, the Gaussian copula model is still the model used as of this day in KMV and CreditMetrics
for credit portfolio risk management as well as in credit derivative trading for portfolio transactions. It is the
model also used by all major rating agencies for rating structured credit products. I have explicitly showed
the linkage of copulas with these models, but the development in this area has come from many dierent
people.
Traveling back in time equipped with today’s experience: How would you change your 2000 pa-
per?
My take on the paper was an engineering approach to solve a practical and thorny problem. I was work-
ing at the RiskMetrics Group as a researcher and writing research papers for clients was part of my formal
mandate. That explains why I wrote the paper as a working paper for the RiskMetrics Group. I was just sum-
marizing a piece of work that I did a few years back. I am not a prolic author, as I had been a practitioner
and my main responsibility was to solve business problems for the company I worked for.
The paper does not have a strong nancial economics theory behind it. That explained why I submitted
the paper to the Journal of Fixed Income instead of a more academic journal. I have been thinking about this
problem for many years and I hope that I will write another paper on the topic and add more theoretical
perspectives to the approach. Certain critical issues have not been addressed well by the paper, such as the
time horizon and risk measure change issues.
When you submitted your paper to the Journal of Fixed Income, what was the tone of the referee
reports?
I didn’t get many comments. I guess this is a practitioner’s journal and the approach was new, the topic
was popular, and it tted the journal pretty well.
Let’s get to the point: Did your model actually destroy Wall Street as allegedly blamed by the fa-
mous WIREDMagazine article [18] entitled Recipe for disaster: The formula that killed Wall Street’?
The nancial crisis started from the subprime crisis. A subprime is a mortgage loan to less creditworthy
borrowers. A mortgage loan is subject to two types of risk: prepayment risk and default risk. This is totally
dierent from a corporate bond, which is subject to default risk only. As stated before we use survival times to
describe a default event, and then use copulas to construct a joint survival-time distribution. For mortgages,
we have to use multiple decrement theory to describe both default and prepayment. From a modeling per-
spective, it is obvious that you cannot apply a copula model for mortgage modeling. Of course, there were
people in the industry trying to “fudge” the modeling by assuming prepayment is prexed and then each
mortgage is only subject to default.
Second, the number of names in an ABS bond or a CDO is quite dierent. The total number of loans in an
ABS could range from a few thousand to several tens of thousands. In corporate credit portfolio modeling we
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usually have at most a few hundred names in the portfolio. The fundamental drivers for default and prepay-
ment in mortgages are interest rates, the house price appreciation index (HPI), as well as the loan borrower’s
own characteristics such as loan to value ratio, credit score, and the loan properties such as xed or oat-
ing, etc. I was using a model called the “dynamic competing risk model” for subprime modeling in which we
modeled both prepayment and default by a Cox model and took the borrowers’ creditworthiness and loan
characteristics as covariates. It was dynamic, as interest rate and HPI are dynamic variables.
So from amodeling perspective the Gaussian copulamodel has nothing to dowith the subprime crisis. In
reality, the Gaussian copula model plus base correlation was used during the nancial crisis period for CDX
and ITRAXX or any corporate credit portfolio modeling with no major issue at all, and it is still in use, even
today. It might have to be enhanced, as people had trouble calibrating the model to the market during the
nancial crisis.
The author of the article, Felix Salomon,was trying to reach out tome. One day he reachedme via Switch-
board, when I was working for an investment bank in Beijing and I had to tell him that I could not speak with
him due to the company policy. I was surprised by the article, especially its title.
Youmentioned the importance of Cox proportional hazardmodels within credit portfoliomodel-
ing. How did you use them?
We were using Cox proportional hazard models with generalized additive model structure for subprime
mortgagemodeling. This is totally dierent from credit portfoliomodelswherewehave atmost a fewhundred
underlying credit names for each transaction andwhere wewould like to use individual information asmuch
as possible. For ABS bonds with subprime mortgages each bond could have a few thousand and even twenty
thousand individual loans as collateral. That is where we would like to use a statistical model to capture the
major features of the loans such as FICO score, property types, loan types, and the dynamic drivers such as
interest rate and house price index (HPI), etc. We actually use a competing risk model, as each mortgage is
subject to dierent types of risk: prepayment and default risks, the functional forms of the dynamic factor im-
pact on the prepayment and default could be treated using a generalized additive model (GAM) structure. So,
the model we used for subprime mortgage modeling is called “Dynamic competing Cox proportional hazard
rate model with GAM structure.”
Some academic papers give the impression that a simple switch from the Gaussian copula to a
more suitable copula family could have prevented the credit crisis. Do you agree?
I do not think so. As stated earlier, the model has little to do with the nancial crisis, especially the sub-
prime crisis with the exception that the model might have contributed to the fact that the corporate portfolio
credit derivative market developed into a large market.
You can denitely use alternative copulas for a better t to market prices. This, however, does not mean
that you have solved the problem, you simply have made some engineering improvement. Back in 1997 we,
the credit derivative trading and quant group at CIBC, had a lot of internal debates about which copula family
to use as we had a group of very talented people (Philippe Hatsdadt, Tarek Himmo, Josh Danziger, Gerson
Riddy, and Stanley Myint). That was why I listed a few copulas in the paper and showed how to compare
dierent copulas by controlling their rank correlation.
Quants [10, 14] at Lehman Brothers initially advocating the Student’s t copula to replace the Gaussian
copula, as the t copula exhibits asymptotic tail dependence. Nevertheless, [17] show that the t copula provides
a worse characterization of the correlation smile than the Gaussian copula approach.
I would encourage people to spend more time and eort studying the theoretical aspects of the model
from a nancial economics perspective. At this stage, it is still purely an engineering model to solve a com-
plicated problem, but without a theoretical justication. This is pretty sad in the sense that we have been
dealing with credit-portfolio problems for more than 20 years without a solid theory. I have had some formal
training in nancial economics duringmypostgraduate studies and I become aware of the dierence between
a theoretical breakthrough and a simple engineering idea.
Considering the nancial crisis of 2007+ as a very expensive case study in quantitative (mis)-
management, what should we learn from it to prevent a similar disaster in the future?
I could highlight a few cases where badmodels were used, whichmight have contributed to the nancial
crisis. I wish we had a standard, public, and commonly adopted subprime mortgage model as popular as
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the Gaussian copula model for corporate credit portfolio modeling, before the nancial crisis unfolded. Even
during the nancial crisis, dierent rms were valuing the same ABS CDO tranches with strongly dierent
results.
The BETmodel fromMoody’s used to be the ratingmodel for all CDO ratings, which is still being used for
CLO ratings today. Rating agencies used a “period-by-period” copula model for SIV transactions, which have
substantially underestimated the correlation risk in the collateral portfolios. This contributed to a signicant
percentage of SIV transactions being downgraded, and investors incurred big losses.
I wish more academic people could spend time and eort studying practical problems. I still feel that
models are useful tools to solve real world problems. We have come to the age of Big Data and FinTech, but
the key elements are still the quantitative methods.
In the public opinion, quantitative models were held to be responsible for mismanagement and
their usefulness was questioned? How do you respond to such arguments?
A model is just one part of the whole business. I would suggest that we should always strive to have
better models, but importantly to have people who can build the models and understand the shortcomings
of a model, and understand the business.
As said by many others, a model is just a tool. You cannot blame a tool. It is the person who uses the
tool, who should take the responsibility for misuse of the tool. There are no alternatives to models in many
complicated situations. For example, you could predict a stock price to go up or downwithout using amodel.
But how about predicting a stock price going upwith 80%probability, and going downwith 20%probability,
now you are stating a quantitative model. As we rely more and more on Big Data and make use of machine
learning techniques, we are using more models. But it is very important to understand the limitations of
models, the assumptions thatwemake, and the appropriateness of the applicability of themodels in practical
situations by doing back testing.
Would you please mention some academic papers that appeared after the credit crisis that – if
known 10 years earlier – might have prevented the crisis?
I do not know a single paper which could have prevented the nancial crisis if written before it. I remem-
ber that many years ago a famous appliedmathematician once said “Mathematics, in every one of its applied
elds, is a good servant, but a badmaster.” The same could be said about models used in the nancial indus-
try. A model is an abstraction of a real-world phenomenon, each model might be able to solve one problem,
but there does not exist a “universal model” which could solve all problems in one eld. The practical world
problems are very oftenmore complex than a typical problem addressed by an academic paper, and themod-
els for these problems are quite sophisticated, too. It is a challenge how to judge if a model really solves the
real-world problem or if the model is still far o. You really need people who do understand the problems
well, and at the same time, also understand the model well, and who can judge the appropriateness of the
model for the problem. As we are using more articial intelligence or machine learning in our daily decision
making, this will become even more important.
There are various books, papers, movies, etc. explaining the nancial crisis in retrospective.
Which one covers reality closest to how you experienced it?
Formore than a year after the nancial crisis I didn’t want to read anything about it. I was working in Bei-
jing, another country, another economy, and trying to help solving another set of totally dierent problems.
Then I spent a lot of time with a group of economists, trying to study how a country like China could de-
velop itself and howmajor global economies interact with each other. The macro perspective has broadened
my view about the nancial crisis which I couldn’t have had if I had continuedmywork leading a quant group
supporting trading business.
I have read a few books, Michael Lewis’ books are always a joy to read, the Bernanke, Geithner, Paulson
memoirs, “Too Big to Fail.” I also watched movies like “Margin Call” and “The Big Short.” It is hard to single
out one book, article, ormovie, whichwould cover it all; each provides dierent and interesting perspectives.
After a long period of drought, the CDOmarket is recovering. Havewemethodologically advanced
to the level of being able to control the involved risks nowadays?
The basic technique of pooling assets or risks and slicing and dicing them into dierent tranches has
existed at least a few hundred years. For example, a reinsurance treaty with a deductible and a ceiling, very
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Figure 5: Left: David Li with his collegues from Barclays. Right: David Li with Evan Picoult, a colleague at Citigroup (2016).
much like a CDO tranche, has existed for a few centuries. For the basic CDOmarket I feel the Gaussian copula
model with base correlation and some variation of it should be able to handle it reasonably well. But more
fundamental research should be done in this area.
Howdoes it feel to nd one’s picture on theWall Street Journal (WSJ) and thus (implicitly) serving
as a scapegoat for the nancial crisis?
It was not my intention to have public exposure. Mark Whitehouse, the author of the Wall Street article,
was introduced to me by Professor Paul Glasserman at Columbia University. Mark was an accomplished jour-
nalist who worked for Reuters for many years, before he took a fellowship at Columbia University. He also
got an MBA degree while he had his fellowship. In 2005 when the credit market had turmoil, Mark wanted to
understand it more, and Paul suggested him to speak with me. I got to know Professor Glasserman in 1995 at
a simulation conference in Ottawa, Canada.
I was just helping him to understand themarket, expecting at most to get a quote of one or two sentences
in an article in the C section of the Wall Street Journal. But a story about the market, along with some story
about people, would be easily accepted for a front-page article in the journal. If you read the article carefully,
it was an article around the credit market. That paper was published in the WSJ in Sept. 2005, see [20].
How did the credit crisis aect you professionally? What role did the media coverage play in it?
The nancial crisis had an impact on all people who were in the business of structured credit products.
Many of my colleagues left the industry, and some for good as the business lost billions of dollars. As a quan-
titative analyst, I often jokedwith people that “we have never created any problems, but always strive to solve
one or two.”
In June 2008, I took a chief risk ocer position at a top Chinese investment bank and moved to work in
Beijing. I wasn’t inWall Street when the nancial crisis fully revealed. I had this strange feeling observing, far
fromWall Street, the evolution of the nancial crisis, going from the subprime crisis, to theWall Street crisis,
and nally to the nancial crisis, and the impact that was felt globally. For example, as a CRO I had to deal
with an emergency that a Lehmann Asian subsidiary bought some stock via our brokerage, and couldn’t get
the transaction settled due to Lehmann’s bankruptcy. As someone who worked in the business from where
the nancial crisis started, I knew the possible impact on the rm or other rms that I either worked for or
dealt with. But not many of us expected that large impact on the global economy as we all concentrated on
one line of business, and its immediately related businesses. On the other hand, we didn’t have a goodmacro
view about the whole situation.
I was consulted very often by our CEO at that time on the nancial crisis. He was surprised that I made
some correct “predictions” and judgment calls. As a result, I was invited to give talks at a few other nancial
institutions and government agencies, but all in closed door meetings.
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For the large part I was more concentrated on the new job. I left China in 1987 and returned in 2008. It
was a country which experienced a tremendous change over the 21 years while I was studying and working
outside of China. The change was unprecedented from a historical perspective with respect to size, pace, and
impact. I was happy to get myself reoriented to the country, the culture, and to be part of its development. I
had more responsibility and covered dierent areas such as the whole risk department. I initiated and built
up a new quant group from scratch. In addition, I was also managing an IT team to build a global equity
trading system with algorithmic trading strategies, the xed income and risk management systems. I was an
adviser to a few government agencies and large corporations, and was involved in some think tanks.
Themedia coverage,mostly out in 1999, had little impact onme. Our company’s PRdepartment had some
monitoring capability for any news involved the company’s name. I would receive a notice whenever a news
article with my name in it came out. For most of the time I just ignored them.
I couldnot ndmany interviewswith you?Whyhaven’t you spoken to themedia before to explain
your role in the credit crisis?
I am not a person who likes to have attention from others or the media. On the research side, I am very
open to discusswith anyonewhomight be interested. The nancial crisis has been causedby the combination
of many forces. It is such a broad topic and I simply happened to work in the business which was blamed
for the ignition of the nancial crisis. The copula approach to credit portfolio modeling, or a simple version
of it the Gaussian copula formula, has been widely used in the industry, which might have contributed to
the development of the credit-portfolio business. But from an academic perspective it is just a simple and
elegant way to solve a complicated problem, but nothing signicant from a theoretical perspective to justify
the attention. More work needs to be done here.
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